There are many ways individuals view climate change, and it is within these separate contexts that solutions are proposed. For example, some view it as strictly a problem of nature—that a warming planet is a consequence of natural atmospheric cycles rather than anthropogenic factors. By that logic, humans need not change their behavior because, eventually, global temperatures will cycle back down. This perspective is shared by many climate deniers. Others, particularly in Silicon Valley, view climate change as a problem to be solved primarily by cutting-edge technology. This perspective is perhaps best articulated by former Google CEO Eric Schmidt, who believes, in Wallace-Wells’s paraphrasing, “that climate change has already been solved, in the sense that a solution has been made inevitable by the speed of technological change” (171).

Still others argue that individual consumption habits are the prime drivers of climate change, and that only with changes to consumer behavior—like driving less and eating vegan—will climate change be solved. This view is shared by individuals on both the left and the right, politically speaking. On the left, this argument takes the form of conscientious consumers who evangelize about the benefits of meatless diets and carpooling. On the right, it takes the form of individuals criticizing environmental activists like Al Gore for riding on private jets.

Wallace-Wells rejects each of these arguments because they detract in varying degrees from what he believes is the only path away from climate devastation: rapid, aggressive political action. Regarding the notion that climate change is a purely natural phenomenon, the author points not only to a vast body of research undercutting this argument but also to a more philosophical observation: that if humans caused climate change, then humans can theoretically fix it. As to the second argument surrounding technology, Wallace-Wells argues that cutting emissions using existing technology—an endeavor that sounds simple but demands an extraordinary amount of political will—is far cheaper than most of the solutions proposed by the technology sector, many of which are entirely theoretical and would only benefit the wealthy anyway. As to the third point regarding individual consumption, the author is blunt, writing:

Eating organic is nice […], but if your goal is to save the climate your vote is much more important. Politics is a moral multiplier. And a perception of worldly sickness uncomplemented by political commitment gives us only ‘wellness’ (187).

The idea that politics is a “moral multiplier” is perhaps best underscored by the example of Jair Bolsonaro, Brazil’s President who pledges to open the Amazon rainforest to deforestation. Not electing Bolsonaro may have prevented the additional 13.12 gigatons of carbon scientists predict will be released between 2021 and 2030 because of the president’s actions. That amount of carbon, Wallace-Wells writes, dwarfs the amount of emissions saved by non-compulsory changes to consumption habits.

The past two centuries of human progress in the United States and Western Europe are often attributed to a triumph of capitalism and the innovation supposedly fostered by free markets. Wallace-Wells contends that much of this progress is illusory in that it is propped up not by innovation, ingenuity, nor entrepreneurship, but instead by a single factor: fossil fuels. The author traces improvements in quality of living, life expectancy, and world hunger to corresponding growth in the extraction and burning of fossil fuels. Now that the world faces a global crisis that can only be remedied through a dramatic reduction in fossil fuels, he predicts that the so-called “apparatus of justification” that’s been built to excuse the ugliest aspects of capitalism will crumble (187), leading to a political revolution.

What this revolution will look like is uncertain. A form of eco-socialism under which nations effectively operate under planned economies is not out of the question. While Wallace-Wells finds promise in such a system, he also acknowledges that this could lead to climate authoritarianism of the kind seen in a nascent form in Xi Jinping’s China. The author also recognizes that capitalist systems and doctrines are already so deeply entrenched in the West that replacing these systems may turn out to be a fantasy. Especially in the example of the US response to Hurricane Maria, Wallace-Wells reads “just how monolithically the forces of capital respond to crises of any kind—by demanding more space, power, and autonomy for capital” (163).

Perhaps the most likely outcome is that the world sees a renovation of capitalism. This renovation could lean in one of two ways, the author writes. The first, more hopeful possibility is that markets learn to adapt to a post-fossil fuel economy, one that can only come into existence alongside a dramatic political push for both overhauled emissions regulations and a federal infrastructure initiative to support it. The second possibility is that capitalism lives on, albeit “outside a single totalizing system to organize the activity” (163). Under this reality, rent-seeking will thrive as the world becomes ever more barren of resources and ever more inhospitable to human survival.

In any case, Wallace-Wells is certain that climate change will exacerbate present social and economic inequalities in such a way that individuals will demand a response from those perpetuating and benefiting from market capitalism. As he points out throughout the book, the poorest countries that contributed least to climate change will suffer most. Young people who already face far more hostile economic and environmental pressures than their parents will seek accountability from the previous generation over their electoral decisions. As permanent Great Depression conditions set in and an already fragile social safety net snaps, individuals from across the demographic spectrum may be compelled to view the ravages of climate change as a referendum not only on the planet’s boundless appetite for fossil fuels but on capitalism itself.

While much of the author’s broader argument takes the form of future projections—the certainty of which, no matter how robust the science behind them, are by definition open to question—his most convincing pieces of evidence surround the consequences of climate change that are already visible. Wallace-Wells articulates this theme most starkly when he writes, “We know what a best-case outcome for climate change looks like, however unrealistic, because it resembles the world as we live on it today” (22).

The most dramatic of these consequences are the increased severity and frequency of extreme weather events, which Wallace-Wells refuses to call “natural disasters,” given that they are the direct result of manmade climate change. The statistics, as related by the author, are staggering: Dangerous heat waves are 50 times more common in 2019 than in 1980. Five out of the 20 worst wildfires to ever blaze through California occurred in 2017 alone. Between 2015 and 2019, three floods hit Houston of such a magnitude that scientists previously predicted such deluges would only arrive every 500 years on average. Disease vectors have also already been altered thanks to climate change. Until recently, the author writes, city-dwellers in Brazil could likely avoid contracting yellow fever as long as they stayed out of the jungle. With the rise of global temperatures, mosquitoes carrying yellow fever have expanded their dominion to include the urban shantytowns of Rio de Janeiro and São Paolo.

The political consequences are also visible, even if they are less directly attributable to global warming. Drought was only one factor that led to the Syrian Civil War, but it was an important factor. In turn, the refugee crisis brought on by the war has been successfully used as a political cudgel by anti-immigration politicians, especially in Europe but also in the United States. Thus, climate change is already affecting not only the planet’s battered coastlines and economies, but also its civil and social systems. Moreover, the refugee crisis is not limited to Syria. According to Wallace-Wells, there were 22 million climate refugees globally as of 2019.

All these very visible outcomes are perhaps the chief contributors to the growing awareness and recognition of the threats posed by climate change, particularly in the United States. They also foreshadow even greater devastation if global temperatures increase to two, three, or even five degrees above pre-Industrial levels.