Abram introduces phenomenology as a philosophical framework from which to understand the contrast between the experienced worlds of Indigenous cultures and the modern Western world. This framework, particularly based on Edmund Husserl’s work, challenges the modern assumption of a single, objective reality, tracing its roots back to René Descartes’s separation of mind and matter. Husserl’s phenomenology aims to return to “the things themselves” (34), focusing on the world as experienced in its immediate presence rather than as an object of scientific analysis. This approach emphasizes the subjective, lived experience as the foundation upon which all knowledge, including scientific knowledge, is built.

Abram discusses how Husserl’s work confronts the solipsism critique by highlighting the body’s role in mediating between subjective experiences and the intersubjective world shared with other beings. This leads to the recognition of a collective, experienced world that precedes and underlies scientific conceptualization. Husserl identifies this preconceptual world as the “lifeworld,” or the realm of direct, lived experience that is influenced by cultural practices and ways of engaging with the world. Despite the diversity of the lifeworld across cultures, Husserl suggests that shared structures or layers exist and that the earth itself provides a fundamental, grounding experience common to all.