Several objections are raised against the Eichmann trial, namely that “Eichmann was tried under a retroactive law and appeared in the court of the victors,” as well as questions about the competence and effectiveness of the Jewish court (254). The court maintains that the laws had to be retroactive as they were trying past crimes of genocide for which there were no precedents, and the question is about the law’s adequacy, rather than its retroactivity. As to the second objection, the Jewish court has “as much right to sit in judgment on the crimes committed against their people as the Poles had to judge crimes committed in Poland” (259). What distinguishes the Eichmann trial from the Nuremberg Trials is that the Jews mete out the judgment regarding the “greatest crime committed during the last war” which “had been against the Jews,” when in Nuremberg, they had felt like “bystanders” (258). What also distinguishes the Eichmann trial from other Successor trials is that Eichmann “had not been duly arrested and extradited to Israel,” which is “a clear violation of international law” (263). However, Arendt argues that if justice is the central goal of this trial, rather than