In the final essay, Marx switches his focus to the philosopher G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831), and whether the critics of Hegel have really innovated upon his teachings. Marx believes that those who think of themselves as improving on Hegel have remained within his framework. One main similarity is stylistic; Hegel’s text is notoriously difficult, and Marx cites a passage from the Hegelian thinker Bruno Bauer that is nearly incomprehensible. Some innovations have made things worse, as the so-called “Young Hegelians” developed an elitist attitude of pitting their quest for higher self-consciousness against the presumed idiocy and superstition of the masses. They are critics who have failed to be properly critical of themselves. Of all the successors to Hegel, Marx’s contemporary Ludwig Feuerbach came closest to the mark. He showed that philosophy and materialism have a religious dimension, dedicated to the establishment of fulfilling social relationships. Feuerbach reoriented the Hegelian philosophy away from overly abstract categories to the real world as discoverable by the senses. Most importantly, he identified the idea of the “negation of the negation,” a philosophical ideal capable of “negating” the “negative” or alienated quality of human existence. In other words, there is a real-world philosophical answer to the most profound problems of existence, but Feuerbach had not quite identified what that was, at least not in any concrete way.